Abstract: According to Democritus, anthropogeny is a microcosmic consequence within the process of cosmogony. However, we are unfamiliar with that which we in fact are, i.e. ἄτομα καὶ κενόν. This poses an existential problem: we do not know what we are and thus, we do not know what to do. To learn what to do, we first need to understand what we actually are. Physics is predeterminant for ethics. From physics we learn to do that which promotes a harmonious ordering of our atoms. We have to re-shape our atomic structure, we have to create a new nature, and thus achieve cheerfulness. After understanding our Being, we can understand our Ought. Democritus is the first Greek thinker who explains to us what our nature is and who, from our being, derives an ought. His atomism thus implies an existentialism.
not unproblematically -seems to identify 3 with necessity, ἀνάγκη 4 , in strict accordance with the laws of atomistic physics, that the cosmoi are formed. In this manner, the cosmos and everything within it comes into existence. Our cosmos is therefore a particular 5 ordering 6 of that which has always been present: namely atoms and emptiness, "ἄτομα καὶ κενόν" 7 .
There is no atom that has not existed for all of eternity. Atoms cannot come into existence and they cannot perish. Only combinations of atoms can come into existence and only combinations of atoms can perish. Coming into existence, in the atomistic sense, means that at least two atoms, however this may occur in individual cases, enter into a connection. Similarly, perishing means nothing but the dissolution of a connection of at least two atoms.
The atomistic principles 8 of order that are valid cosmogonically are also valid intracosmically. Within the cosmos, the same principles apply which made the cosmos possible in the first place and which led to its formation. In the course of this linear 9 cosmogonic process, zoogeny comes to pass, that is, the formation of life.
Atoms and emptiness ultimately come together in such a way that something is produced that can be deemed alive, however this may happen exactly 10 . We can understand what alive meant to Democritus when we examine his statements on breathing that Aristotle outlines in De respiratione. Democritus says that breathing has the effect of preventing the soul from being squeezed out […] . He says that the soul and the hot are identical, consisting of spherical atoms, and when these are separated out by the squeezing of the surroundings, help comes from breathing. For in the air there are a great number of atoms of that kind, which he calls mind and soul; when one breathes in these come in along with the air and, by resisting the pressure, prevent the soul which is in the animal from slipping out. That is why life and death depend on breathing in and out. For when the pressure of the surroundings gets the upper hand and there is no further external supply to resist it, i.e., when the animal cannot breathe in, then death occurs; for death is the loss of those atoms from the body through the pressure of the surroundings. (T 106c = DK 68 A 106) A body is alive as long as a sufficient number of atoms, i.e. very fine, very maneuverable atoms, are present to constitute a soul, or more precisely, a "soul-cluster"
11
. With the constitution of a soul-cluster, an atomic aggregation becomes a living thing. This soul-cluster "is responsible for the animation of living beings, namely respiration, production of movement, change, and, therefore, the processes of growing, reproducing and aging, with sensation and intellection as operations of the soul that are of vital importance for the economy of living beings."
12
The fine microscopic soul-constitutive atoms, Democritus teaches, constantly flow out of us. They are constantly squeezed out of us by the pressure of 9 It is, incidentally, remarkable "to find in Leucippus and Democritus a conception of the infinity of time with no trace of cyclical return in any form. Worlds come into being and pass away, but there is no repetition of this world. " (Guthrie, The Presocratic Tradition, 429) 10 Tiedemann expressed it beautifully when he wrote that Leucippus thought that "nur deshalb haben Thiere Leben und Empfindung, weil in ihrem Körper und durch ihre Organisation, Feuer=Atomen sich anhäufen, und hängen bleiben. " (Tiedemann, Geist der spekulativen Philosophie, 239) 11 Vlastos, Ethics and Physics in Democritus (Part One) , 579, see also Taylor, Democritus and Lucretius on Death and Dying, 78. 12 Peixoto, Life, Birth and Death in Democritus, 149. the environment. We must thus breathe in to replenish these atoms in order to remain alive. These fine microscopic bodies are found in the air that surrounds us. By breathing in, we constantly draw new soul-constitutive atoms into ourselves. That which is alive thus dies in precisely the moment in which it no longer has enough suitable atoms to constitute its soul, i.e. when it can no longer breathe in order to supply itself with these atoms 13 . Democritus' self-propelling atoms themselves are not to be referred to as alive. The criterion of self-propulsion does not become decisive for the determination of life until Plato, for example in his Phaedrus, Phaedo or the Laws
14
. Democritus, however, states that the things that there are are always in motion in the void, and that there are infinitely many worlds differing in size, some with neither sun nor moon, some with sun and moon larger than ours and some with more. (DK 67 A 10 = T 78)
We learn virtually no details about the ongoing movement of the atoms and there is no information on the original atom movement, i.e. that movement which caused the cosmogonic collisions of the atoms and which is not simply the consequence of these collisions 15 . The atoms are in motion, that is an indisputable fact in atomism, even though movement does not inherently define them 16 . The question as to why this should not have been the case for all of eternity is of no consequence for the atomists 17 . They declined, as Liepmann stated, "über die Lehre: 'Es ist seit Ewigkeit so' hinauszugehen." 18 The movement from one place to another has existed for all of eternity. The atoms themselves are as they are and will never change -and the same holds true for the void. The atomists did not consider it necessary to provide their universal cause with a cause of its own, with some force that produced it. Epicurus' thoughts on the matter are in a similar vein. He, too, understands atoms as being in motion without initiation, with the declination of the atom also being expressly without a cause 19 . Single atoms are therefore not alive, since they do not breathe, i.e. they do not have a soul-cluster. Breathing or being alive is necessarily a matter of more than one atom, it comes into being only when a soul-cluster is formed. However, as a constituent component of all atomic combinations, they are also constituent components of life. Vitality was formed in the same manner as the cosmos, with the human being also being formed in this way. Anthropogeny is a microcosmic event within the process of cosmogony 20 . In the human being, everything can be found that is necessary for the formation of a cosmos: atoms and emptiness. This is true only on a more abstract level, since not all types of atoms that exist do occur in the atom-formation that is a human being 21 . Human beings are atoms and void. We have a soul made of atoms and retain this soul made of atoms, at least for a certain limited period of time, by breathing. Life must be understood as a characteristic of a particular ordering of atoms, since the atoms themselves are not alive. Life, as we can express using a modern term, is something that emerges from a particular ordering of atoms; life seems to be some kind of aggregate property. We find in atomistic thought, as Guthrie has pointed out, "the complete emancipation from any trace of animistic or teleological explanation." This atom complex that is us has the wondrous possibility to grasp itself in thought, feeling, perception and spiritual life, even though we not aware of our own atomic structure. The life that we are perceives itself as life, but does not perceive its structure on an atomic level. We are unfamiliar with that which, according to Democritus, we in fact are. This poses a fundamental or, as we wish to say, an existential problem: we do not know what we are and thus, we do not know what to do. We do not know our Ought and we do not know how our Ought is being determined by our being which is nothing but ἄτομα καὶ κενόν.
Speculative physics are first necessary in order to arrive at that which truly is, at that which we truly are. These physics are speculative 23 , something that is sometimes forgotten, because their objects -atoms and emptiness -cannot be observed 24 . They are deduced: ἄτομα καὶ κενόν are "Gedankendinge" 25 , they are an "ontologisches Postulat"
26
, an "intellectual hypothesis to explain phenomena"
27
. The atom complex human being can be speculatively deduced in its true nature via the possibilities brought forth by its atomic ordering.
We do not understand ourselves and there is even a further peculiarity in the case of the human being that Democritus specifically addresses. The human being has a problem that we find only once in the cosmos -at least nothing to the contrary can be found in the surviving fragments of Democritus' work. He says:
One should realize that human life [ἀνθρωπίνην βιοτὴν] is weak and short and heaped up with all sorts of evils and disasters, so as to aim at moderate acquisition and measure one's trouble against what is necessary. (T D 150 = DK 68 B 285) 28 23 Hegel famously pointed out that atomism is actually not a materialism, but an "Idealismus im höheren Sinne" (Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie I, 359). "Das Prinzip des Eins ist ganz ideel, gehört ganz dem Gedanken an, selbst wenn man sagen wollte, daß Atome existierten. Das Atom kann materiell genommen werden, es ist aber unsinnlich, rein intellektuell: die Atome Leukipps sind nicht die molécules, die kleinen Teile der Physik. " 24 See again Hegel: " [D] as Eins kann man nicht sehen, es ist ein Abstraktum des Gedankens. " (Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie I, 358) See also Burnet's remark, that it "is a curious fact that the Atomists, who are commonly regarded as the great materialists of antiquity, were actually the first to say distinctly that a thing might be real without having a body. " (Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, 357) . See DK 68 B 156 = T 178c. 25 Kinkel, Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, 62. 26 Gadamer, Antike Atomtheorie, 524sq. 27 Guthrie, The Presocratic Tradition, 499. Indeed, as Farrar expressed it: "Atomism is designed to explain the phenomena. " (Farrar, The Origins of Democratic Thinking, 212) 28 See also T D 33 = DK 68 B 149.
Democritus recognises the suffering of the human being. We consider that Democritus observes, in addition to the dimension of the physical, to use modernising terminology once again, the factual -that is: ἄτομα καὶ κενόν -a dimension of the existential -and that is also: ἄτομα καὶ κενόν. But in the latter case, ἄτομα καὶ κενόν-order constitutes a soul-cluster which brings with it that ability to suffer from life, from being what it is, from being that particular ἄτομα καὶ κενόν-order. Suddenly, cares, difficulties, weaknesses, "all sorts of evils and disasters", the many possibilities of suffering, come into existence, or rather, some atomic orders are suddenly being perceived by another atomic order, by a living atomic order, as painful. In the perception of the atomic ordering known as human being, unhappiness can come into existence. It is not possible to determine why we perceive one thing or another as happiness or unhappiness. However, we are able to understand that strong and violent movements of atoms lead us to feel uncomfortable. Again, the reasons for this cannot be determined and must be accepted as facticity. It is part of the cosmic setup. A person in a state of unhappiness experiences a specific atomic situation. In the words of Democritus:
Blessedness and wretchedness belong to the soul. εὐδαιμονίη ψυχῆς καὶ κακοδαιμνίη. (T D 24 = DK 68 B 170)
The human being, however, does not wish to be unhappy, he/she does not wish to live in this ordering of atoms. He/She seeks cheerfulness, perhaps we can say, using a modern term, he/she seeks existential relaxation -and this not only for him/herself: Democritus' ethics have an expressly social character 29 . But we have the problem with reality in that we do not properly understand it.
In reality we know nothing; for the truth is in the depths. ἐτεῇ δὲ οὐδἑν ἴδμεν· ἐν βυθῷ γὰρ ἡ ἀλήθεια" (T D 15 = DK 68 B 117)
The helpless human being, in his/her existential need, invented for example the metaphysics of τύχη to orient oneself in life, which is, according to Democritus, a failed attempt to grasp reality:
People fashioned an image of fortune [τύχης εἴδωλον] as an excuse for their own folly. For in a few cases fortune conflicts with prudence, but most things in life intelligent clear-sightedness keeps straight. (T D 29 = DK 68 B 119) Because our intellect, even though it was itself born of necessity, does not necessarily comprehend its own necessity or the necessity of the course of the world in its factual reality, the human being resorts to ideas such as coincidence. However, Democritus deduces speculatively, there is no coincidence, only necessity. Democritus, in contrast to Epicurus, seems to have taken atomism as a description of facticity very seriously. Democritus speculates and he might have been aware of that, but he firmly believes he is grasping reality as it is. And in truth, on the factual level of ἄτομα καὶ κενόν, as the famous -and only -fragment of Leucippus with which Democritus for sure was in full agreement states, there is no coincidence:
Nothing happens in vain, but everything from reason and by necessity. οὐδέν χρῆμα μάτην γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπ᾿ ἀνάγκηϛ. (T L 1 = DK 67 B 2)
Our ignorance means, in a practical sense, that we do not know how we could and should encounter our unhappiness. The human being does not know what is to be done and what is to be avoided and thus stands -initially, i.e. before the development of the atomistic theory helps our understanding -helpless before the question: what should I do? And therefore, the human being constantly does, albeit involuntarily, things that consolidate his/her unhappiness. The human being, for example, always wants more than he/she needs -a deplorable habit also condemned by Herodotus great and enviable, and one will cease to suffer in one's soul through the desire for more. For he who admires those who have and who are congratulated by others and is always dwelling on them in his memory is continually obliged to get up to new tricks and in his desire to achieve something to attempt some wicked deed which is forbidden by the laws. Therefore one should not seek those things, but should be cheerful at the thought of the others, comparing one's own life with that of those who are faring worse, and should congratulate oneself when one thinks of what they are suffering, and how much better one is doing and living than they are. For by maintaining that frame of mind one will live more cheerfully and will avert not a few evils in one's life, jealousy and envy and malice. (T D 55 = DK 68 B 191) 34 The Pleonectic 35 also want to be happy, but without being aware of it, they are working against their own happiness; atomism has not yet enlightened them. The atomistically unenlightened human being, despite being made up of primordial matter, does not naturally do that which promotes an ordering of his/her atoms that would lead to his/her cheerfulness. He/She does not do that which optimises, i.e. calms the motion of the atoms 36 , he/she does not do that which makes him/her relax in cheerfulness. All that can be said about us existentially is essentially a statement about the ordering of microscopic bodies. Democritus does not speak metaphorically here 37 . The human being, according to Democritus, misunderstands him/herself. This misunderstanding is the result of ignorance of his/her own origins, the facticity fundamental to all things. We are a rather specific cluster of quite specific atoms, we are alive, but still "ἐτεῇ δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν", "in reality only atoms and void" 36 It is a wondrous moment in atomism that the anthropology of atomism seeks to calm, i.e. to reduce, the motion of the atoms. Our cheerfulness comes into existence when we reduce the eternal movement of our parts to a minimum. This brings a mysterious tension into the theory that we would just like to point out here, without yet being able to provide an interpretation for this tension. The atom determines through its facticity our existential scope. He/She who does not wish to understand that greed produces detrimental motion within us, and that this motion, for whatever reason, makes us unhappy, simply does not know who or what he/she is and thus does not know what to do. Without the (speculative theoretical) atomist understanding of reality, one is lost in this very same reality, one cannot understand what is going on and what to do.
We find here a pattern that becomes entrenched in Western philosophy until Kant: the idea that life can be led properly, that -in Kantian terms -practical reason can be made proper use of once theoretical reason has clarified how things stand for us in reality. Kant, quite correctly as we believe, was to turn this supposition around 39 . But it is still remarkable how similarly Kant and Democritus understand the existential situation in which they find the human being. We are, as Kant elucidates, in need of something that we are necessarily unable to reach. "Human reason", he says, has the peculiar fate in one species of its cognitions that it is burdened with questions which it cannot dismiss, since they are given to it as problems, since they transcend every capacity of human reason. 40 Like Democritus -and, of course, many other philosophers -Kant searches for a way to calm human reason. Kant found out that human reasons can "find peace only in the completion of its circle in a self-subsisting systematic whole." 41 Human reason has not yet found a way to complete its circle and it necessarily cannot complete the circle, because it misunderstands itself, it misunderstands what to do. Human reason attempts to find release using its theoretical powers, but those powers, as Kant points out, are severely limited -at least with regard to the questions which human reason "cannot dismiss". The crucial question is: "Is this striving [of human reason] grounded merely in its speculative interest, or rather uniquely and solely in its practical interest?" 42 And this is the moment where Kant and Democritus fundamentally differ. We need, according to Kant, to understand that the "need of reason", the "Bedürfnis der Vernunft" is twofold: first in its theoretical, second in its practical use. The first need I have just mentioned; but one sees very well that it is only conditioned [bedingt], i.e. we must assume the existence of God if we want to judge about the first causes of everything contingent, chiefly in the order of ends which is actually present in the world. Far more important is the need of reason in its practical use, because it is unconditioned [unbedingt] , and we are necessitated [genötigt] I cannot even assume God, freedom and immortality for the sake of the necessary practical use of my reason unless I simultaneously deprive speculative reason of its pretension to extravagant insights; because in order to attain such insights, speculative reason would have to help itself to principles that in fact reach only to objects of possible experience, and which, if they were to be applied to what cannot be an object of experience, then they would always actually transform it into an appearance, and thus declare all practical extension of pure reason to be impossible. Thus I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith [.] 44 Democritus firmly believed that theoretical reason has primacy over practical reason. He agrees with Kant that the human being suffers from a self-misunderstanding. But whereas Kant finds the self-misunderstanding in using theoretical reason for problems of practical reason, Democritus finds the self-mis- understanding in the lack of theoretical understanding of the reality that is the world and the human being. And thus, strictly contradicting Kant, Democritus' solution to the human being's existential problem is to understand reality itself in its alleged objectivity. For Democritus, accordingly, the issue is clear: physics are predeterminant for ethics 45 . And thus ethics is basically physics. Ethics for Democritus is "bei näherer Betrachtung […] eigentlich nur ein Zweig der Naturwissenschaft"
46
, as Rudolf Hirzel already noted in 1877 47 . We, too, are just atoms and we must accept this 48 . But we do have a possibility to deal with this fact. While we are atom complexes formed from necessity, and this is not systematically thought out by Democritus (and was only to become a notorious problem in Hellenism), we are able to change ourselves -we are not fully determined by necessity.
Our living nature, which is too unfamiliar with itself to care appropriately for itself, is nevertheless able to develop. We must create for ourselves a new, a second nature 49 . We must be educated:
45 See McKirahan, Philosophy Before Socrates, 324 (the Atomists "present a two-world theory in which the phenomena in one world are reduced to entities and events in the other. The two worlds are strikingly different: the complex phenomenal world with its many different kinds of things, which are made of but a single material, which differ only in size and shape, and whose only behaviour is to move in place. "). is an integral part of a larger theory which does not, as a whole, represent a Socratic flight from the influence of fortune and circumstance [.] Internal order is essential to the imposition of order upon the world; but perhaps it is safest simply to absorb life's bumps, and not to strive to shape its course. This ambivalence, evident in the atomist portrayal of human nature as both an inward-facing condition and an outward-facing capacity, emerges at a different level in Democritus' comments on political life. However, the present point is that if Democritus' theory was ambivalent, it was genuinely ambivalent. Man must confront the world as it is. "). Nietzsche sums it up as, "'Begnüge dich mit der gegebenen Welt' ist der sittliche Kanon, den der Materialismus erzeugt hat. " (Nietzsche, Democriteia, 371 ; ευθυμία, as Johnson expressed it, "is ultimately up to us" 57 -it is from here that the fundamental optimism of the atomistic theory arises.
It becomes possible for us to be as we must be according to our first nature, in order to be cheerful -and to be cheerful is "the ultimate human interest" 58 , it is "the best thing for a man […] ; excess and deficiency are apt to fluctuate and cause great changes in the soul. And souls which change over great intervals are neither stable nor cheerful. (T D 55 = DK 68 B 191) Thus, it is indeed up to us to become cheerful. We can become an εὔθυμος through moderation (μετριότητι τέρψιος) and proportion (βίου συμμετρίῃ). The εὔθυμος is, as von Fritz has described it so accurately, "der Wohlgemute, ist derjenige, der ohne Vielgeschäftigkeit und ohne aufwühlende Leidenschaft in innerer Harmonie und heiterer Gelassenheit in jedem Augenblick das Richtige tut, der ohne sich von den äusseren Umständen abhängig zu machen, ihnen doch aktiv als Handelnder und Erkennender gegenübertritt." 62 Democritus' thoughts on the emergence of culture, which make possible something along the lines of a trans-generational education, also belong in this context. He says experience and vicissitudes have taught men this, and it is from their wealth of experience that men have learned to perform the things they do. (T 186 = DK II, 423) While we are only atoms and emptiness, we exist as living entities in a more emphatic sense, inasmuch as we can experience our ordering as happiness and unhappiness.
In conclusion, in a state of unhappiness, the atom complex that is a human being realizes that something is not right with itself. The human being has to be or has to become an atomist physicists to understand the lack of harmonious order in our atoms as the basis of its unhappiness. From this constitution of being, from that which we are, an atom complex, a physical substance, we can then derive what is to be done. From here we can determine what ought to be done: that which makes the ultimate human interest an atomic reality; that which ensures that we, our closest, our society etc. are no longer uncheerful; and that which brings the atoms into a certain order. We must bring calmness to our inner motions, the eternal motion of our constitutive matter must slow down and we must achieve cheerfulness, which 61 See T D 27 = DK 68 B 3. 62 von Fritz, Philosophie und sprachlicher Ausdruck, 33. is nothing but a "state of a physical substance"
63
. And this is a central point, physics is valid for every person. It is in this sense that we understand these words:
To everyone the same thing is good and true; pleasant differs from one to another. (T p. 236, 69 = DK 68 B 69)
We often do not do that which is to be done in order to become cheerful. But, as Democritus asserts, we are able to find out what is to be done, we are able to find out what ought to be done. This point is of decisive importance for us: we find in Democritus the first thinker who explains what our nature is and who derives from our nature, from our being, an ought, deriving ethics from physics. He/ She who, as a human being, and as a highly specific atom complex, wishes to do the right thing for him/herself and for others, stands under the compulsion of the ought to do that which brings the maximum degree of calmness to the atoms. The good it is talked about here 64 is nothing but the "atomic 'being' itself."
The atoms and the emptiness are there, they exist, but when atoms combine to form complexities, more precisely: when they combine to form a person, there arises a need for an ought, an ought-to-be, a new, a second nature which assures an existentially enjoyable life. We thus find in Democritus a direct connection between being and ought, a way to deal with the hardships of being a human being: we find an atomistic existentialism. 63 Taylor, The Atomists, 232. We do not agree with Taylors assumption "such state is describable in the terms of physical theory" (ibid.) and follow Vlastos that T D 55 = DK 68 B 191 indeed does provide a physical description of cheerfulness (see Ethics and Physics in Democritus (Part One), 581. 64 We agree with Taylor that the so-called Demokrates sayings from which T p. 236, 69 = DK 68 B 69 stems, "even if (as is likely) their ultimate source is the writings of Democritus, represent a stage of transmission of the tradition more distant from Democritus himself " (Taylor, The Atomists, 226 
